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In the Supreme .. Court 
of the State of .U ta.h 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Reipondent, 
v. Case No. 7762 · 
ROSE DUCINNIE DAVIE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF A-ND RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as stated in the appellant's brief 
is acceptable to the State. The statute under which this con-
viction was had is 103-51-21; Utah C~de Annotated 1943, 
insofar as it is pertinent to this appeal_ and provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person: 
( 1) To keep a house of ill fame resorted to for the 
purpose of prostitution or lewdness, or to willfully 
reside in such house, or to resort th~reto for lewdness; 
or,. 
(2) * * * 
2, 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. STATE'S WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS, MAN-
DONADO, MUIR AND LYMAN WERE NOT ACCOM-
PLICES. 
II. EVEN ASSUMING WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS, 
MANDONADO, MUIR AND LYMAN WERE ACCOM-
PLICES, THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAIL-
ING TO SO INSTRUCT THE JURY. 
III. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMIT-
TING THE RECORDS OF THE TEL,E;PHONE COMPANY, 
THE POWER COMPANY AND THE INSURANCE 
f 
AGENT. 
POINT I 
STATE'S WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS, MANDON· 
ADO, MUIR AND LYMAN WERE NOT ACCOMPLICES. 
The defendant was charged with the crime of keeping a 
house of ill fame resorted to for the purpose of prostitution and 
lewdness. We do not have a statutory definition of accom-
plices. Section 10;.-1-43, Utah Code Annotated 1943, defines 
who are principals. In the case of State v. Bowman, 92 Utah 
540, 70 P. 2d 458, this court stated that the word "accomplice" 
has been construed to refer to one who is or could be charged 
as a principal with the d_efendant on trial. 
Defendant acknowledges that the witnesses could not 
be charged with the crime of keeping a house of prostitution, 
but asserts, apparently, that defendant and the witnesses could 
4· 
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have been charged under that part of the statute making it an 
offense to Hresort thereto for lewdness." Defendant, however, 
\vas not charged with resorting, and even if the witne~ses could 
have been charged under the separate offense of resorting 
"thereto for lewdness" that would not make them accomplices 
in this case. 
Cal~fornia has a statute defining principals which is . sub-
stantially similar to ours. -
Section 11.11 of the Penal Code of California which 
requires that testimony of an accomplice be corroborated before 
a conviction can be had was amended in 1915 to define an 
accomplice as follows: 
An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable 
to prosecution for the identical offense charged against 
defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony 
of the accomplice is given. 
This amendment came about as a result of the decision -of 
People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, 119 P. 901, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
704, \vhich is cited by defendant. Since the time of the amend-
ment the courts of California have given a much stricter and 
restrictive definition of an accomplice. !he case of People v. 
Clapp, 151 P.-2d 237 (1944), 24 Cal. 2d 753, is an illustration. 
This was a case where the defendant had performed an abor-
tion upon one of the witnesses, and two other witnesses had 
watched the operation. It was aserted ·on appeal that the two 
witnesses who were present. during the operation. were ac-
complices, and, therefore, their testimony needed to be cor-
roborated as required by Section 11.11 of the Penal Code. 
The court stated: 
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* * * It is necessaty ·to determine whether sections 
_ 31 and 971 of the Penal Code or other· provisions of 
. the criminal _law subject the witness to prosecution 
under the provisions that the defendant is~ accused of 
violating, or whether the acts of the ·witness partici-
pating in the transac;tion. constitute a separate and dis-
tinct offense. If a statutory provision so- defines -~ crime 
that the participation of two or more· persons is neces-
sary . Jor its commission, ·but prescribes punishment 
for the acts of certain participants only, and another 
statutory provision prescribes punishment for the acts 
of participants. not subject td the first. provision, it is 
clear that the .latter are criminally liable only under 
the specific provision relating to their participation in 
·the criminal transaction. The specific provision making 
the acts of participation in the transaction. a separate 
offense supercedes the general provision in section 31 
of the Penal Code that such acts subject the participant 
in. t~e crime of the accused to prosecution for its com-
mtsston. 
The reasoning of this case was e~te~ded in the case o£ People 
v. Grayson, 189 P. 2d 285_, 8 Cal. App. 2d 516 (1948). The 
appellant __ was . convicted of receiving and holding a- wager on 
a- h?rse race. On appeal he complained -that a witness, one 
. Pease, who placed a. bet with the defendant, was an accom-
plice. In this. case there were not tw_o separate statutes cover-
ing the offenses, but section 3 7a of the Penal Code of Cali-
forni~ had several _subdivisions. Subdivision 3 made it illeg~l 
for a person to receive bets.· Subdivision 6 of· the section made 
. it illegal for a person to offer o~ pl~ce a bet. The court reasoned: 
* * * So, here·, since the act of placing a bet, with-
out which, of cpurse, the bet could not be received by 
another, . was punishable as a separate offense under 
subdivision 6, and was not specifically under sub-
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division 3, it was not punishable under section 31, 
and Pease was not an accomplice of appellant who re-
ceived the bet. The testimony of Pease was sufficient, 
without corroboration, to prove the offense charged in 
count one. 
The de~end~nt in the present ca~e is ch~rged with keep-
ing a house of ill fame. Section 103-51-21, Ptah Code Anno-
tated 1943, has several subdivisions. Within subdivision 1 
there are· several clauses, to-wit: 
It shall be unlawful for any person: 
( 1) To keep a house of ill fame resorted to for the 
purpose of prostitution or lewdness, or to willfully re-
side in such house, or to resort thereto for lewdness; 
It is the contention of the State that each of these clauses is 
a separate and distinct offense just as though they were set 
out in separate subdivisions or separate sections_. Consequently, 
if the above-mentioned witnesses were guilty of a crime it 
was a separate and distinct offense--that of resorting to a house 
of ill fame for lewdness. 
It has been held in Iowa that a woman engaged in pros-
titution in a house of ill fame is not an ~ccomplice of the 
person charged with the management of .the house. This W~S 
based upon the theory that there was no affirmative partici-
pation in the acmal management. T~e Iowa statute defining 
principal is similar to ours. In State v. Anderson, 38 NW 662, 
the d~fendant was. convicted . of keeping a house of ill "fame. 
Four women who stayed in the house testified to numerous 
acts of prostitution in the place and under the supervision of 
the defendant who received ·part of the remuneration· paid to 
the women by the men patron~zing the house. rwo of these 
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\VOmen did not assist ln . its . management. The other two 
did such work as night cl~rking, serving drinks and hustling. 
The lower court failed to instruct that the two· who did not 
. ' . ' : ' . . . . . . ~ . . 
have any control of the managemen_t of the house w~re accom·-
_plices. The court did. in~truct that the other two were accom-
plices and that the statute of Iowa required corroboration. The 
appellate court sai~; 
tc * * * Two of these \Vitnesses were intimates of 
the· place but did not assist in its management, there-
fore they were not to be deemed accomplices. How-
ever, there is evidence from which the jury could find 
t\vo other witnesses were accomplices. (Page 665). 
See also People v. Webb; 25 N.Y.S. 2d· 554; reversed on 
other grounds, 26 N.Y.S. 2d ~·86; People v. Swift, 261 App. 
Div. 808, 23 N.Y.S. ·1022; Jackson v. United States, D. C. 
App. ( 1919), 48 App. D. C. 269; S~ate v. Chauvet 1900, 111 
Iowa.687, 83 N.W. 717, 51 L.R.A. 630, 82 Am. St. Rep. 359; 
Stone v. State ( 1919), 47 Tex. C. Cr. 575, 85 S.W. 808; 
People v. _Richard~on ( 1917), 22 N.Y. 103, 118 N.E. 514; 
16 C.J. 1388, page 681. It should be noted that New York, 
Io\va and California have statutes which are substantially 
si1nilar to the State of Utah's defining principal and requiring 
corroboration of accomplices' testin1ony. . 
It is not contended that these four witnesses in the present 
case had any acti:ve management in the keeping of the house 
of ill fame which the defendant is accused of operating. It 
is, therefore, submitted that they were not accomplices any 
more th~n was the prostitute in ·the Iowa case. 
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POINT II 
EVEN ASSUMING WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS, 
MANDONADO, MUIR AND LYMAN WERE ACCOM-
PLICES, THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAIL-
ING TO SO INSTRUCT THE JURY. 
This court in the case of State v. Simpson, 236 P. 2d 
1077, decided October 26, 1951, squar~ly met the ques-
tion of whether the refusal of a trial judge to instruct the 
jury regarding the testimony of accomplices and the need 
for corroboration thereof was in error. 
As to the third point, while it is perhaps a better 
practice for the trial court to give a cautionary instruc-
tion regarding the testimony of an accomplice, it is 
generally held that this is a matter which lies within 
the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not reversible 
·error to fail to give such an instruction. People v. Ruiz, 
144 Cal. 251, 77 P. 907; Commonwealth v. Beal, 314 
Mass. 210, 50 N.E. 2d 14; State v. Gaddis, 131 N.J.L. 
44, 34 A.2d 735; Gordon v. State, 188 Miss. 708, 196 
So. 507; U. S. v. Block, 2 Cir., 88 P.2d 618; and People 
v. Nathanson, 389 Ill. 311, 59 N.E. 2d 677. p. 1083. 
The instructions usually given in criminal cases as to 
the weight of testimony and the credibility of witnesses was 
given in this case. Instruction No. 13 is particularly in point. 
You are the sole judges of all questions of fact, of 
the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the 
witnesses. In weighing the testimony you may con-
sider the bias, if any is shown, of any witness to testi-
fy for or against any party, his interest, if any, in the 
result of the trial, his appearance on the witness stand, 
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and ·any probable motive which he may have to tell 
that. vvhich is not true; you may ~on~ider the reason:-
. ableness of the witnesses'· statements, their apparent 
· frankness and candor, or the want of it, their oppor~ 
tunity to· know and understand, and their capacity to 
remember, and from all the facts and ·-circumstances 
. given in evidence determine what w~ight ought to be 
given to ~e testimony of any witness.. . -
There was ample corroborative evidence coming from 
police officers Garside (R. 32-61) (R. 133, 136), Bennett 
·(R. 104~136), Wilson (R. 127), and Henderson (R. 106), 
and the other witnesses . 
. POINT III 
TI-IE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMIT-
TING THE RECORDS OF THE TELEPHONE COMPANY, 
THE POWER COMPANY AND THE INSURANCE 
AGENT. 
The record of the telephone company was 'identified by 
the unit manager of the. Ogden office. He identified them as 
records of the company which showed telephone listings of 
the users of the service of the company. He stated that they 
\Vere from nis office, and that he had access to them (R. 82). 
As to the power company's records the person identifying 
those records stated he was an employee of the power com-
pany,· that he took the records from the files of the power 
company of which he had charge, and ·that it was his duty to 
keep records of the -~sers. of the . power company' s·· service (R. 
103-104). 
10 
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This state has recognized the Hshop book" rule in several 
cases, a list of which is given in Clayton v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co .. , 96 U. 331, 85 P. 2d 819, 822. In the case of Bohlke 
v. Wright, 93 P. 2d 321, 200Wash. :~74 (1939), it was urged 
that it was error to allow the admission of the record of a tele-
phone conversation. The divisional manager of- the telephone 
company was allowed to identify the record. 
The slip of paper was part of the records . of the 
telephone company, and as such was entitled to be 
admitted in evidence. Cit~tions omitted.) p. 32~·. 
See also Pinkerton's National Detective Agency v. Rosedale 
Silk Co., 184 Atl. 282, 121 Pa. Supra 496. 
The records of the insurance company were identified by 
Mr. Harold Tribe, who shared business office space with the 
insurance agent, William J. Holmes, who at the time of the 
trial, was out of the state. He testified that they shared offices, 
that they had had occasion to assist each other in various ways 
and were familiar with the records in each other's business. 
He identified an insurance diary which was kept in the files 
at Hour office." On cross examination he testified that he had 
an occasion to take ~nd replace the record in the insurance 
company's files, and that -the record came from the file in 
their office (R. 99-102). 
The necessity of verifying the correctness of entries -
by the b9okkeeper, clerk or other pe~son who made the 
entries in a book of accounts is obviated or necessarily 
relaxed when such per~on has died, has become and 
remains at the time of the trial, insane or physically 
unable to attend as a witness, is beyond the jurisdiction 
11 
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of the court or otherwise unavailable as a witness. 
* * * . 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Section 1070. 
It is submitted that Mr. 'Tribe had ample opportunity to be 
familiar with d1e records of the insurance company inasmuch 
as he had a joint office \vith this insurance .company and had 
assisted the agent thereof in various ways. 
CONCLUSION 
lt is respectfully submitted that the lower court did not 
err in refusing to instruct on accomplices' testimony or in 
admitting into the evidence the records heretofore referred to. 
Respectfully, 
12 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
J. RICHARD BELL, 
Assistant Attorney General 
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